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Much recent scrutiny has been given to the significance of  the external 
border between Scotland and the rest of  the continuing United Kingdom, 
given the debates surrounding the 2014 Scottish Referendum and its 
aftermath (see for example Black, 2014). However, Scotland’s internal 
borders in the form of  local authority boundaries, and the often-fuzzy 
politico-legal line between the responsibilities and powers of  Scotland’s 
national (devolved) government and its 32 unitary local authorities merit 
attention also (see maps at Scottish Government undated, and Undis-
covered Scotland, undated —  hyperlinks in bibliography). Any such ana- 
lysis must take cognisance of  these local authorities’ historical antecedents, 
if  it is to comprehend the patterns of  institutional and cultural continuity 
and change which have marked their development into their present 
forms, and to fully appreciate their contemporary challenges. This article 
delineates the broad contours of  continuity and change in Scotland’s 
local state organisation. It draws on existing politico-historical research, 
using this to better illuminate the problems and opportunities faced by 
this often under-examined sphere of  government, not least contempo-
rary debates on “community empowerment”. It begins by considering 
the emergence of  recognisably modern (Victorian) local government in 
Scotland, before delineating the major organisational and institutional 
changes to the system, leading ultimately to the current disposition.
The roles, status and functions of  Scottish local government as it has 
developed since 1833 have often proved complex, contested and con-
tingent, whilst remaining intimately connected to the long debate over 
Scotland’s status within (or potentially outside) the Westminster state 
itself. In this context, Morton highlighted that the nineteenth-century 
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Scottish local state represented a key outlet for the patriotic energies of  
middle-class Scots, who saw in it an opportunity to make the 1707 union 
settlement work in their interests via local civic nationalism, rather than 
breaking up the union or devolving power from Westminster (1996, 1999). 
Over time, Scottish local government institutions became increasingly, if  
not always willingly, more democratically accountable (Pugh, 2014b, p. 4; 
Atkinson, 1904, p. 31). Meanwhile, population changes accompanying 
industrialisation and urbanisation were reflected in progressive legisla-
tive concessions to local self-government in newer communities. These 
sought the means to form local municipal bodies to address pressing 
problems of  public order and, increasingly, public health. John Stuart 
Mill wrote of  the merits of  locally accountable representative bodies, on 
the basis that they would serve as a bulwark against the tyranny of  the 
majority, and, more anti-democratically, as a guarantor of  expert govern-
ance by educated local elites (2001, pp. 168–80). Across the party divide, 
Benjamin Disraeli also fondly viewed locally self-governed communities 
as an important building block of  society (Parry, 2007, p. 30). Abroad, 
Alexis de Tocqueville and Rudolph Gneist separately extolled the virtues 
of  local self-government as a mechanism for moderate, middle-class rule 
(de Tocqueville, 1998 [1831] chapter 4; Schmitt, 2008, p. 332).
Yet as the nineteenth century progressed, local self-government was 
eclipsed by newer ideas in the form of  municipal socialism and pro-
gressivism, resulting in centralising impulses and territorial consolida-
tions, especially in and around Glasgow and Edinburgh (see for instance 
Pugh, 2014a, passim and 2014b, pp. 4–6). (For more information on mu- 
nicipal socialism, see Fraser, 1993.) Successive local government reorgan-
isations in the twentieth-century created municipal structures seen to be 
increasingly distant, literally and figuratively, from their local citizens, by 
circa 2000. Given this disconnect, key actors in the sphere of  Scottish 
local government, including the Scottish Parliament, the Convention of  
Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), and non-governmental organisa-
tions, such as the Jimmy Reid Foundation, have published reflections, 
reports and recommendations on optimising local democracy and effi-
ciency, community identity and civic voluntarism with mass democracy 
in a digital age (see COSLA, 2014; Scottish Parliament, 2014; Gallacher 
et al., 2007, passim; Newton, 1982, passim; and Bort et al., 2012, passim). 1
This article contextualises these debates by offering a long view of  the 
development of  Scotland’s local government institutions, paying especial 
  1. For an England and Wales perspective on the same issues see also Stoker & Wilson (2004, 
passim).
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attention to the themes of  borders, jurisdictions, democracy, efficiency 
and power. It examines the emergence of  recognisably modern local state 
apparatus from circa 1833, and the implications of  the haphazard terri-
torial spread of  local government, especially for competing jurisdictions 
and community identity, as centralising impulses grew more powerful. 
The analysis then turns to three successive (20s, 70s, 90s) twentieth- 
century reorganisations, culminating in the contemporary context of  32 
unitary authorities and the debate over how best to realise aspirations 
of  “community empowerment”. This longer view of  the migration of  
municipal borders, jurisdictions and, the evolving legislative context in 
which these have developed, allows for a more nuanced and reflective 
consideration of  the persistent nature of  the challenges encountered by 
Scottish local democracy. Thus, it offers a concise historical analysis of  
the constraints and opportunities it faces under the current system, and 
in straitened economic times.
The limits of fragmentary nineteenth-century local 
self-government
Before 1832, local governance in Scotland’s counties, as distinct from its 
established urban burghs, was conducted remotely by the Commissioners 
of  Supply, with Justices of  the Peace (JPs) as the most local arbiters of  
county administration (Whetstone, 1981, pp. 89–94 and 49–58). The 
urban burghs fell into two categories: royal burghs, whose status derived 
from the crown, and burghs of  barony and regality, whose status derived 
from aristocratic patronage.
Scottish JPs, despite holding the same formal powers as their English 
counterparts, had comparatively little influence and prestige (Urquhart, 
1992 pp. 2–3). Mabel Atkinson, the early twentieth-century Fabian scholar 
of  Scottish local administration, noted that this form of  county govern-
ment was one where most inhabitants had “no voice”, and with no powers 
over public health, lighting or paving (1904, p. 74). In that context, she 
averred it was unsurprising that “all the villages wanted to be made into 
burghs, with the right to provide these things for themselves” (ibid.). From 
1771 to 1832, in the continuing absence of  a Scottish legislative frame-
work for local governance, and with industrialisation and urbanisation 
occurring at different speed and intensity in different places, a variety 
of  larger and established burghs moved to secure “police” powers via 
bespoke local Acts of  Parliament (Urquhart, 1991b, p. 5).
The term “police” in this context derived from the Greek politieia or 
the Latin politia, with a much wider meaning than its contemporary one 
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(ibid., p. 2). Police acts allowed the creation and empowerment of  local 
authorities to deal with matters including crime and punishment, water 
supplies, paving, lighting and maintenance of  streets, sewers, drainage 
and cleansing, nuisance control and general public health. Communities 
could request the powers that appeared most relevant to their particular 
local circumstances. By 1832, towns as diverse as Glasgow, Edinburgh, 
Greenock, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Leith, amongst others, had secured 
such acts (ibid., p. 5). By then, it was clear that a general police act for Scot-
land, from which all communities could obtain the powers they needed, 
would be cheaper and more effective, not to mention less demanding of  
parliamentary and local citizens’ time, than the then-extant patchwork of  
ad hoc local acts (Pugh, 2014b). In 1831, the Convention of  Royal Burghs 
(the then representative body for Scottish local government institutions) 
pressed unanimously for such legislation to be passed urgently (Urquhart, 
1991b, p. 5). The Whigs’ overwhelming victory in the landmark 1832 
general election galvanised the cause of  parliamentary and municipal 
reform. The resulting Burgh Police (Scotland) Act of  1833 embodied the 
liberal notion that a town’s inhabitants should be empowered to iden-
tify their local concerns and priorities, deciding via representatives what 
funding should be allocated (Urquhart, 1991a, p. 99 and McCaffrey, 1998, 
p. 27).
The Act was pioneering in the United Kingdom context: both for the 
range of  issues it empowered localities to tackle, and for the discretion, 
flexibility and relative autonomy it entailed contrasting with subsequent 
English public health laws (Prest, 1990, pp. 188–9). Yet it was more effec-
tive in principle than in practice, due to significant defects in its design: a 
restricted franchise, limited powers over local taxation and borrowing, as 
well as a lack of  ability to enforce decisions relating to public health and 
nuisances. Even Scotland’s larger towns found themselves unable to fund 
major schemes for water, sewers and drainage (Urquhart, 1991b, p. 99). 
Moreover, the selective franchise (initially £10 upwards on rental) meant 
that the improvements implemented tended to focus on the most affluent 
streets and neighbourhoods least likely to require them ( McCaffrey, 1998, 
p. 28). New towns like Johnstone and Galston were not covered by the 
legislation (ibid.). So, after minor refinements in 1847 and 1850, the need 
for a new act granting more extensive and wider-ranging powers was 
widely acknowledged. Before discussing the legislative framework that 
emerged from this, it is important to consider some of  the ramifications of  
the often arbitrary and irrational municipal and county borders, bound-
aries and jurisdictions that permeated the 1833 General Police Act and, 
as is seen below, continued to inform its successor Acts well into the twen-
tieth century.
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The local autonomy conceded under such legislation was typically 
conditional and circumscribed in practice. The United Kingdom’s largely 
uncodified constitution then, as at this writing, vested sovereignty in the 
Westminster Parliament, without entrenching powers at “subordinate” 
levels of  government (Smith, 2005, p. 46). Moreover, the decision to 
grant a locality “police burgh” status and/or police powers were for the 
county sheriffs, reinforcing that such municipalities exercised only del-
egated authority within legislative constraints (Atkinson, 1904, p. 78). 
For instance, local taxes could only be raised for pre-approved purposes, 
although contributions could be sought for “voluntary” projects in local 
tax demand letters (ibid.). The formal subordination of  police burgh to 
county administration impeded rational governance. For example, Kin-
ning Park, a neighbourhood on Glasgow’s southside, adjacent to the then 
police burgh of  Govan, itself  became a police burgh in 1871. This was 
largely because its location in Renfrewshire doomed attempts to amal-
gamate it with Govan (Maver, 1990, p. 132). The general police legisla-
tion did not entertain burghs forming across county lines, even where this 
would have been most practicable or desirable. There were also symbolic 
and ceremonial indications of  the contingent status of  Scotland’s new 
municipal institutions.
Until 1900, police burgh representatives were not formally permitted 
to style themselves as provost (chief  magistrate, equivalent to mayor), bailie 
(magistrate) or councillor. Rather, they were more mundanely described 
as chief  magistrate, junior magistrate and (police) commissioner, respec-
tively (Maver, 2008, pp. 92–3). This did not deter police burgh leaders 
from adopting these honorifics, nor indeed from adopting the municipal 
coats of  arms that were also formally denied them until 1900 (ibid., p. 92). 
Maver argues that these practices were no accident, given they “con-
ferred gravitas and suggested a sense of  history to fledgling communities” 
which, alongside the erection of  custom-built town halls promoted “a 
tangible sense of  municipal authority” (ibid., p. 36). As such, “tradition 
was often invented to reinforce municipal values on the public conscious-
ness” (Maver, 2007, p. 30). This resonates with Cohen’s reflection that 
ritual and symbolism together play central parts in the affirmation and 
reinforcement of  community boundaries, which for the purposes of  this 
article are broadly defined as both literal and jurisdictional (Cohen, 1998, 
p. 50). Claims to longstanding provenance were prominent in police burgh 
leaders’ rhetoric and demeanour, resonating with Hobsbawm’s definition 
of  “invented tradition” as, essentially, an attempt “to establish continuity 
with a[n ideologically] suitable historic past” (1992, p. 1). There was, in 
short, something about the very modernity of  the legislation enabling the 
creation of  so many new municipal bodies that seemed to demand their 
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swift cloaking in ersatz historical provenance and ceremony. But this does 
not detract from the wider importance of  the General Police Act and its 
later iterations.
For all its flaws, the 1833 Act had, probably most importantly, con-
ceded the broad principle of  local self-government (Urquhart, 1991a, 
p. 100; Pugh, 2014a, pp. 40–3). Morton has emphasised the importance 
of  appreciating the “complexity of  mid-Victorian government”, and 
its “decentralised” nature in Scotland’s urban communities, where the 
role and importance of  civil society and civic nationalism were growing 
(Morton, 1996, p. 259). Here was a Scottish version of  what was later 
termed “civic republicanism”, where administration is entrusted to the 
people of  a community, through representatives (see Delanty, 2003, 
pp. 81–6). In legislative terms, the need for an enabling framework for 
local self-government had secured widespread acceptance—even pop-
ularity—by 1850, when an improved Police of  Towns (Scotland) Act 
was passed (Urquhart, 1991a, pp. 2–4). The 1862 General Police and 
Improvement (Scotland) Act represented the most significant Scottish 
legislation of  Prime Minister Palmerston’s administration, but owed its 
animal spirit to Leith Burghs’ provost William Lindsay (Urquhart, 1991b, 
p. 13).
Lindsay had become frustrated by the limitations of  the existing legis-
lation when attempting to improve working-class housing and public 
health, taking inspiration from the 1858 English Local Government Act, 
which allowed communities to seek “provisional orders” to proactively 
address such issues (Campbell Irons, 1896, pp. 531–4). This English legis-
lation had been inspired in turn by Scotland’s pioneering general police 
acts, indicating reciprocal emulation and innovation across the Scottish- 
English border (Prest, 1990, p. 46). Lindsay’s bill was drafted and con-
sulted on extensively at considerable personal expense, made possible 
by his occupation as a wealthy shipwright (Urquhart, 1990, pp. 16–17). 
Although it encountered some turbulence and revisions in the House of  
Lords, the bill was soon enacted. As well as securing and consolidating the 
ethos of  the earlier general police laws, it—in contrast to these—provided 
a mechanism for ongoing revisions to be made as required (Urquhart, 
1991b, p. 17). Until the 1880s, Lindsay was instrumental in shaping later 
iterations of  the Act; his work significantly influenced the 1892 Burgh 
Police (Scotland) Act. McCaffrey noted that the Lindsay Act and its later 
iterations led to 185 towns, 84 of  which were not burghs, improving their 
local conditions and it was essentially this act that created Scotland’s 
“typical Victorian urban landscape of  baronial town halls and regular 
paved streets lined with rows of  stone tenements, shops and pubs” (1998, 
p. 17). It led to the formation of  four brand new police burghs, ranging 
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in population from Kingussie, Inverness-shire with 700 souls at incorpo-
ration, to Clydebank, Dunbartonshire, at 10,000 (Urquhart, 1991, p. 2). 
The flexibility embodied in the 1862 act entailed significant variations in 
the extent to which police powers were adopted across Scotland. Popu-
lous places, like the districts of  Partick and Govan, near Glasgow, became 
police burghs, whilst the jurisdictions of  some established burghs over-
lapped with nearby police burghs (but not, of  course, across county lines), 
such as in Dumfries and Maxwelltown (Urquhart, 1991b, p. 2). The co- 
existence of  police and more established burgh communities could be 
the focus of  both resentment and mockery; sometimes simultaneously.
The emergence of  a distinctively Scottish “town hall mentality”, where 
burghs and their representatives were seen as the focal point of  local 
public life, was noted especially in newer communities (1991, p. 433). 
For example, the Glasgow Bailie’s columnists grew “quite apoplectic” at 
the thought of  residents from burghs surrounding the city benefitting 
from its amenities such as public parks without paying for their upkeep 
(Burgess, 1998, p. 60). The pretentions and absurdities discerned in such 
parvenu communities’ civic leadership were encapsulated in the columns 
of  fictional Bailie correspondent “Jeems Kaye”, whose “adventures and 
opinions”, from 1876 until the late 1880s, were eventually compiled 
in three books (ibid., p. 62). The author was Archibald Macmillan, a 
commission agent with a Glasgow business address but resident on the 
Ayrshire coast, who wrote prolifically for periodicals. His fictional alter- 
ego was a coal-merchant in the real Glasgow district—though never 
actually a burgh—of  Strathbungo. It is likely that fictionalised Strath-
bungo was a thinly disguised version of  Crosshill on the city’s south-side. 
Kaye, typifying a self-made “good citizen”, became heavily embroiled 
in local politics, serving variously as a juryman, school board member, 
census enumerator, corporal in the Royal Volunteers (in which guise he 
was knighted by Queen Victoria), a canvasser, and later unsuccessful can-
didate in parliamentary elections. He ended his public career as “Lieu-
tenant Colonel Sir Jeems Kaye, self-styled provost (see the discussion of  
burgh nomenclature above) of  Strathbungo” (ibid., p. 64). As a bailie, he 
successfully defended his burgh from annexation by Glasgow at the 1888 
boundary commission. This echoed real life politico-legal tussles arising 
from the city’s long-running campaign to consolidate outlying districts 
under a centralised administration run on rational lines.
The general police Acts’ flexibility in response to emerging local needs, 
rather than national imperatives, was a source of  both strength and weak-
ness. Complications arising from a lack of  central oversight included wide 
variations between burghs in population size and territorial coverage, 
and a patchwork of  sometimes overlapping municipal boundaries and 
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jurisdictions. This fostered confusion and politico-legal conflict, given the 
jealousy with which many police burghs guarded their “independence” 
even (especially) when their incorporation into larger, consolidated local 
authorities, benefitting from economies of  scale, would have made more 
objective sense. The Victorian convention (which did not persist beyond 
the First World War) that Parliament would not assent to the abolition of  
a municipality without the consent of  local citizens—via their represent-
atives—was in many ways laudable. But it could hinder needed public 
works and the introduction of  progressive local taxation.
Atkinson argued that the police burgh procedure “stretched local 
autonomy too far”, given inhabitants of  overcrowded districts might ob- 
ject to the cost of  their rational administration (Atkinson, 1904, pp. 75-7). 
Nor, she felt, should small areas have had the absolute right to declare 
themselves burghs. Whilst the inhabitants’ wishes “ought to be most seri-
ously considered [they were] not the sole determining factor”. In the 
history of  Glasgow and its surrounding police burghs, Atkinson instanced 
many drawbacks of  police burgh administration, and its persistence in 
the face of  what she considered to be more efficient, up-scaled and cen-
tralised administration (1904, passim). Notwithstanding Atkinson’s frus-
trations, there were other, albeit less tangible factors explaining the police 
burghs’ longevity despite the onslaughts of  municipal socialism and na- 
tional efficiency which doomed them. 2 Similar territorial consolidation 
was entailed in Edinburgh’s “reabsorption” of  neighbouring Leith in 
1920 (Maver, 2008, p. 42).
One reason Glasgow’s surrounding burghs survived various boundary 
commissions was by countering the city’s arguments about “community 
of  interest”. They did so by invoking antiquarian histories of  their com-
munities’ pre-police burgh antecedents, which they claimed gave them at 
least as much legitimacy and right to exist independently as the city itself. 
Govan and Partick, the two largest and most populous police burghs 
bordering the city, as well as two of  only nine Scottish communities—
including Glasgow and Edinburgh—to have populations above 50,000 
in 1900, were the most effective players at this game, and therefore the 
last burghs to be annexed (see Pugh 2014a, pp. 52–4). A related idea 
to Hobsbawm’s “invented tradition”, germane here, is Anderson’s con-
cept of  “simultaneity” (1991, p. 24–7). Simultaneity explains community 
cohesion predicated more on sentimental and emotional ties than formal 
politico-legal ones (ibid.). Emotive ties often entail particular understand-
ings of  past events and contemporary institutions and practices, which 
  2. For detailed analysis of  the rise and fall of  the police burghs surrounding Glasgow, see Pugh 
(2014a and 2014b).
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would not necessarily be seen by outside observers as causally connected. 
So simultaneity is more organic than the ceremonial contrivance marking 
Hobsbawm’s “invented tradition”, but both concepts together can help 
academics understand communities’ resilience. During their annexation 
battles, Govan and Partick’s civic leaders made much of  their communi-
ties’ genuinely ancient (harking back to the Viking and medieval periods, 
respectively) provenance, belying their much more recent police burgh 
status (Pugh, 2014a, p. 53). Both burghs’ local newspapers played a key 
role in promoting awareness of  this antiquarian legacy (Pugh, 2011). Sim- 
ultaneity and invented tradition are useful for making sense of  commu-
nity identity in Scottish localities throughout the upheavals of  twentieth- 
century local government reorganisation, to which this analysis now turns.
Democracy versus efficiency:  twentieth-century 
developments
Scotland’s Victorian and Edwardian local state apparatus gradually be- 
came more rational and democratic, whilst remaining grounded in the 
country’s naturally occurring communities. For all the emphasis on local 
self-government, the autonomy of  Scotland’s burghs was only relative, 
circumscribed by a complex legislative framework, and encroached on 
by an array of  joint boards and commissions dealing with shared respon-
sibilities for turnpikes, county roads, police, prisons and school boards. 
McConnell noted that this system was “exceptionally complicated and 
diverse”, and overlain by a “virtually incomprehensible combination of  
shires, sheriffdoms, parishes, towns and counties” (2004, p. 46). In par-
ticular, the centralised system of  county council and parish council admin-
istration implemented in the 1890s was seen by rising Labour politician 
and former Kirkintilloch magistrate Thomas Johnston, as inimical to 
grass-roots involvement in local politics and stifling of  policy innovation 
(Maver, 2008, p. 42). The 1929 Local Government (Scotland) Act sought 
to streamline this system, such that 869 parish councils, 33 county coun-
cils and 200 burgh councils were replaced by 21 large burgh councils, 
176 small burgh councils, three county councils and 196 district councils 
(Pugh, 2014b, p. 6). Overlapping arrangements remained for services like 
police, fire, valuation and social work.
These changes had been politically controversial, and the Convention 
of  Royal Burghs (COSLA’s predecessor body), led by Hamilton Provost 
Sir Henry Keith, successfully secured multiple amendments to the orig-
inal bill, diluting its stronger centralising tendencies and “preserving the 
integrity of  the prevailing system” (Maver, 2008, p. 42). Labour and the 
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Liberals formally opposed the bill, and many commentators objected 
to the elimination of  smaller-scale local government institutions. But 
the government emphasised the supposed resulting gains in efficiency 
and professionalism, seeking to impress businessmen. Hutchinson noted 
the latter “resented local taxes and were themselves amalgamating and 
consolidating [their firms]” (2001, p. 52; Torrance, 2006, p. 116). The 
new distinction between “small” and “large” burghs, the latter of  which, 
with populations below 20,000, had reduced status and powers, echoed 
Mabel Atkinson’s earlier criticisms of  the patchwork distribution of  local 
government institutions (ibid., p. 42). Given similarly unpopular reforms 
were passed for England the same year, it is probable the backlash on 
both sides of  the border contributed to the defeat of  the Baldwin govern-
ment at that year’s general election (Pottinger, 1979, p. 35). As was seen 
above, Morton highlighted that nineteenth-century local self-government 
played a key role in sublimating demands for national self-government (in 
the form of  a Scottish parliament or assembly). Such sublimation of  overt 
nationalism had its limits, as was suggested in the involvement of  Provosts 
Keith and Sir Alexander MacEwen (Inverness) in founding the Scottish 
Self-Government Party in 1932 (Maver, 2007, p. 43). Within a few years 
this party amalgamated with the new Scottish National Party (SNP), and 
both provosts had been inspired to found it by what they perceived as the 
“degrading” of  the burghs as distinctively Scottish institutions. This di- 
minution of  Scottish local government’s status and autonomy, in the face 
of  greater control and restructuring by the Scottish Office on behalf  of  
successive UK governments, characterised the remainder of  the century, 
as is seen below.
The advent of  near universal adult suffrage, combined with the dom-
inance of  Keynesian economics and state intervention after the Second 
World War, saw local government throughout the United Kingdom ac- 
quire wider responsibilities and even less overall discretion than before 
(White, 2004). The new functions included, among others, town planning, 
social services and economic development (McConnell, 2004, p. 47). The 
1960s Labour governments of  Prime Minister Harold Wilson, with their 
vaunted focus on long-term planning and regional development, seri-
ously doubted Scottish local government’s capacity to achieve these goals 
in its then form (Pottinger, 1979, p. 178; McConnell, 2004, p. 47; Maver, 
2008, p. 44). In 1966, Labour’s Lord Wheatley was appointed head of  
a Royal Commission to investigate its structures, functions and possible 
reforms. The Wheatley report opened with the ominous—and, as is seen 
below, still resonant—assertions that something was “seriously wrong” 
with Scottish local government, and “a completely new structure” was 
needed (Wheatley, 1969, p. 1). It drew renewed attention to convoluted 
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and inefficient structures built on arbitrary boundaries, which provoked 
conflict and inhibited smooth working across and between authorities 
(ibid., p. 32–4). It also challenged the large number of  needlessly small 
local authorities, duplicating resources. Wheatley averred that all these 
problems meant the central state was, perhaps paradoxically, too involved 
in the minutiae of  local governance: even if  only to iron out jurisdic-
tional disputes and inefficiencies in resource distribution (ibid., pp. 32-4). 
Wheatley further criticised the archaic workings of  Scottish local author-
ities, predicated on “nineteenth-century elements” as barriers to public 
understanding and participation in local politics by ordinary citizens (ibid.). 
Despite all this, Wheatley recognised the importance of  a sense of  local 
community embodied in municipal institutions, declaring that “a burgh 
does not cease to be a burgh because it is no longer a self-contained unit 
of  local government” (ibid., p. 263; Maver, 2007, p. 44).
Such sensitivity towards local feeling did not prevent Wheatley pro-
posing systemic reforms, including the formal abolition of  the burghs and 
counties, which were replaced with a two-tier structure of  large regional 
councils overarching various smaller district councils. The regional coun-
cils took responsibility for major planning, water and sewage, education, 
social work, housing, police and fire, realising previously untapped eco- 
nomies of  scale, whereas the district councils focused on more localised 
services like local planning, housing improvement, parks and leisure, envi-
ronmental health and licensing (McConnell, 2004, p. 48). Beneath these 
two tiers, which were compulsory in the Local Government (Scotland) 
Act 1973 (passed with Wheatley’s proposals largely intact under Con-
servative Prime Minister Edward Heath, reflecting a degree of  bipartisan 
consensus on local government reform in this period), local communities 
also had the option to establish community councils (Pugh, 2014b, p. 7; 
McConnell, 2004, p. 49; Pottinger, 1979, pp. 177–8). These new bodies 
seemed to reconcile the voluntary and permissive aspects of  the nine-
teenth-century framework with the deliberative scrutiny of  councillors’ 
voting and administrative records in the old ward system, but in a twen-
tieth-century context (Pugh, 2014b, p. 7). It is perhaps no coincidence 
that, while the two-tier structure lasted only three decades, community 
councils still survive at the time of  writing, despite their lack of  statutory 
powers. Under the 1973 act, nine regions and 53 districts were estab-
lished in 1975, as well as three unitary, all-purpose authorities for Orkney, 
Shetland and the Western Isles (McConnell, 2004, p. 49). By 1983, over 
1,000 community councils had been set up, serving eight in ten Scots. In 
their early years, the new structures were criticised for perceived bureau-
cracy and remoteness from local people by the SNP, the Liberals and 
sections of  the media, although this was debatable ( McConnell, 2004, 
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p. 49). The most abominable aspect of  the new structures, as far as their 
critics were concerned, was the leviathan Strathclyde Regional Council, 
covering half  of  Scotland’s population in the central belt ( Pottinger 1979, 
p. 178). If  balancing local democracy and economic efficiency is diffi-
cult, some systems come closer to achieving this than others (see Pugh, 
2014b, passim). In this context, the two-tier structure recommended by 
Wheatley was innovative, even if  the drawing of  regional boundaries was 
 problematic.
Whilst the Wheatley reforms’ critics had their grounds, so did those of  
the 1990s reorganisation, without similar levels of  consultation or cross-
party support. Just as the earlier shakeups in Scottish local government 
organisation had been influenced by fluctuating support for home rule, 
so was the move to the post-1996 structure of  32 unitary authorities. 
Margaret Thatcher, visiting Edinburgh soon after her appointment as 
Prime Minister in 1979, had promised “all-party talks aimed at bringing 
government closer to the people”, as an alternative to Labour’s aborted 
devolution proposals (Thatcher, 1993, pp. 35–6). However disingenuously, 
she conceded in her memoirs that “in the event we did so by rolling back 
the frontiers of  the state”. The Scottish Constitutional Convention of  
1989–1995 was not quite ‘all-party’, given the SNP’s withdrawal from 
it, and the Conservatives’ refusal to participate. But it did involve other 
parties and a wide range of  groups from civil society, including local 
authorities via their representative body, COSLA, which contributed 
significantly to its funding. A significant outcome of  the Convention was 
agreement, between Scottish Labour, Scottish Liberal Democrats and 
the SNP, that the introduction of  legislative devolution in the shape of  a 
Scottish parliament would justify the abolition of  the two-tier structure 
(McConnell, 2004, p. 50). This was in large part to deflect accusations 
that legislative devolution would merely add another layer of  elected 
politicians and, in essence, to avoid charges of  over-governing.
Conversely, the Conservative-controlled Scottish Office was tempted 
to abolish large local government regions like Labour-controlled Strath-
clyde, covering over 40% of  Scotland’s population in the central belt. 
The concurring policies of  rival parties made the Conservatives wary 
of  pursuing this strategy, but ultimately did not deter them. From 1991, 
Scottish Secretary Ian Lang and the Scottish party leadership proceeded 
on these lines with minimal consultation. Opposition to the changes was 
muted, given that Labour and the Liberal Democrats supported unitary 
authorities, albeit they viewed them as a corollary to legislative devolution 
(McConnell, 2004, p. 49). The new structure took effect on 1 April 1996, 
following the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1994. The extent to which 
it resulted in a simplified, streamlined structure with local services gath-
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ered under “one roof ” is contested, given the persistence of  an unelected 
“second tier” above the unitaries in the form of  (unelected) institutional 
cooperation between local authorities. Moreover, several commentators, 
not least the social democratic Reid Foundation, have highlighted low 
public awareness and understanding of  local government structures and 
processes, as well as low participation in local elections (Bort et al., 2012, 
pp. 5–9). The Foundation’s 2012 report on the “silent crisis” of  Scottish 
local democracy paints a gloomy picture (ibid., p. 4):
[We] find a country which by many measures has one of  the weakest local 
democracies in Europe. The distance between where people live and their 
first ‘local’ democratic structure is, in some cases, greater than the distance 
across entire EU nations. The number of  people it takes to elect a single 
councillor is ten times the European average. When local government in 
Scotland builds a ‘local’ school, it seems never to build just one. Instead 
it waits until it can build half  a dozen schools in one contract as if  a ‘big 
box’ approach is inherently better for everyone by dint of  not being a local 
 solution.
The long-awaited arrival of  legislative devolution in 1999 did little 
to address these difficulties; indeed MacDonald noted that the arrival of  
the Scottish Executive / Government cemented the “Cinderella role” of  
Scottish local government in national life (2009, p. 199). In many ways, 
the power of  policy initiative had migrated towards central / national 
government, whilst market reforms tended to recast local inhabitants as 
consumers rather than citizens (ibid.). There is irony here, given  COSLA’s 
leading role in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which was in many 
ways midwife to the devolved Scottish Parliament (House of  Commons, 
2003; see also Gay et al., 1995, passim). This illumines both the long-
standing strength of  the connections between local government arrange-
ments and wider constitutional questions, and that, to an extent, Scottish 
local government could be viewed as acting against its own interests in 
helping to establish the new Parliament. These centralising tendencies 
have been taken still further in the creation of  Scottish national policing 
(Police Scotland) and Fire (Scottish Fire and Rescue) services—the effi-
cacy and local accountability of  which remain contested (see for example 
Dickie, 2015). (Readers seeking detailed information on relations between 
local authorities and the Holyrood Parliament in the devolved context 
should consult COSLA, 2014a, and Scottish Parliament, 2014.)
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Plus ça change ?  Twenty-first century “community 
empowerment”
Since the 1970s there has been a greater degree of  consensus between 
Scotland’s political parties on the roles, structures, powers and constitu-
tional status of  local government than they would tend to admit. As was 
noted above, the Wheatley reforms were implemented on a bipartisan 
basis by a Conservative government, despite being originally commis-
sioned by the preceding Labour government. Similarly, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons, the introduction of  unitary authorities in the mid-1990s 
was welcomed in principle by Labour and the Liberal Democrats, despite 
their preference for this reform to accompany the arrival of  legislative 
devolution. There is further consensus between the parties over the con-
tracting out of  council services to private enterprise and “arms-length” 
agencies, in line with a pattern which Rhodes famously characterised 
as the “hollowing out” of  the state (1997, passim). Neither the Labour- 
Liberal Democrat Scottish Executive (1999–2007) nor the SNP (2007–) 
Scottish government have reversed these reforms.
There are also symmetries between current policies of  “community 
empowerment” and Michael Forsyth’s (Lang’s successor as Secretary of  
State for Scotland) 1995 demand that all unitary authorities “must pub-
lish draft decentralisation schemes for their areas, for local consultation” 
(House of  Commons, 1995, pp. 20–4). Such schemes were intended to 
further three key objectives: bringing services and decision-making closer 
to the people (a familiar Thatcheresque phrase, as seen above) where 
this would result in improved services, enabling the public to influence 
and shape the design of  council services, and to provide generally more 
effective and responsive local government. There was also an emphasis 
on the need for nebulously-defined “partnership” with a variety of  gov-
ernmental and non governmental actors, “not least the private sector” 
in making and delivering policy (ibid., p. 20). On a related note, Forsyth 
enjoined the new unitary authorities to embrace the principle of  subsidi-
arity, in the form of  delegating much decision-making and operational 
oversight from the council chamber to various local bodies, including 
community councils, residents’ associations, tenants’ associations and 
school boards (ibid.). He acknowledged that such bodies attracted “little 
interest and support” but averred this was simply because “they are not 
given enough to do”.
Twenty years on, the Scottish Parliament has passed the Community 
Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, with almost unanimous and cross-
party support: 101 votes to nil with 15 abstentions (Anonymous, 2015). 
Conservative Members of  the Scottish Parliament abstained on the 
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grounds that the bill gives too much power to Scottish ministers in the 
event of  appeals over refusal by councils to grant community groups’ 
requests; they argued for clear regulations about these matters, avoiding 
the need for ministerial discretion (ibid.). The Act gives community groups 
a greater say in the use of  vacant land and buildings, and in the running 
of  local services. Significantly, and inadvertently echoing the discourse 
of  Victorian and Edwardian boundary disputes discussed above, the Act 
could be invoked by “communities of  interest” sharing an interest, back-
ground or activity, as distinct from communities of  place formed of  local 
inhabitants (ibid.).
Notwithstanding the near unanimity involved in the Act’s approval 
by the Scottish Parliament, it has been the focus of  criticism by a variety 
of  commentators, including the present author, for being insufficiently 
radical in terms of  the degree and range of  powers devolved to local 
communities (see for example Pugh & Connolly, 2014, and COSLA, 
2014b). It can also be interpreted as inadvertently privileging elite par-
ticipation. Middle class communities are equipped with expert knowledge 
and understanding of  policy and legislation, and so are likely to bene- 
fit disproportionately from community empowerment, thereby further 
entrenching social inequality. COSLA, commenting on the draft bill, 
had two key concerns: first that the bill should take the opportunity to 
enshrine local self-government in law, in line with the 1985 European 
Charter; second, that given the bill imposes new duties on local author-
ities, these should be financed and resourced by central government, and 
therefore become cost neutral to local government (COSLA, 2015b). 
Whilst COSLA’s recommendations in this context could be uncharitably 
viewed as self-serving to the point of  facetiousness, they do serve to high-
light the longstanding vulnerability inherent in Scottish (and indeed UK- 
wide) local government’s lack of  entrenched constitutional status, as well 
as its reliance on the central state for funding. 3 In the concluding sec-
tion of  this article, the analysis opens out to reflect on the remarkable 
continuity between Scottish local government’s present predicament and 
earlier forms of  (sort of) community empowerment. What lessons can 
be learned, and how rigid is the border between central and local gov-
ernment power? Is local government a mechanism for, or an obstacle to, 
genuine community empowerment?
  3. It should be noted that COSLA is itself  in the grip of  a disaffiliation crisis which has led to the 
formation of  rival representative bodies for certain councils, analysis of  which lies outside the scope 




Despite its recent coinage in the context of  Scottish Parliament legisla-
tion, there is a sense in which a perennial debate over what “community 
empowerment” can and should mean in reality has characterised local 
government arrangements in Scotland since 1832. This has been reflected 
in successive laws and redrawing of  the local government map, as well as 
in the migration of  relative autonomy from the local to the central state 
(i.e. Lords Advocate until 1885, Scottish Office until 1999, and thereafter 
the Scottish Executive / Government). Given the increasing demands on 
the state in general, in an age of  universal welfare provision underpinning 
basic human rights, the reluctance of  the centre to risk much by way of  
local discretion is probably understandable, if  far from ideal. The en- 
abling framework, established and refined in successive general police 
acts between 1833 and 1890, encouraged local self-government on a 
micro-level that was ultimately unsustainable. Twentieth-century reforms 
gradually eroded the most meaningfully local aspects of  local government. 
But perhaps the 2015 Community Empowerment Act really does offer 
local communities the opportunity to redress the balance in their favour.
In this context, there is some symmetry between the enabling “spirit” 
of  the nineteenth-century police legislation and the philosophy under-
pinning the 2015 legislation. Both had the potential for local citizens to 
take control of, or even create for themselves, local institutions and amen-
ities for the benefit of  their communities, with countervailing risks of  
entrenching middle-class privilege at the inadvertent expense of  the less 
affluent, in an environment where the central state’s role is increasingly 
hands-off. Important differences remain. The general police framework, 
for all its flaws, strengthened and built up the local state, whilst community 
empowerment, with the best of  intentions, has the potential to speedily 
eviscerate its discretionary functions. In sponsoring the 2015 Act, the 
Scottish Government has been emphatic in ruling out further top-down 
reform of  Scottish local government structures as a means of  reconciling 
local citizens with their local states; in this sense community empower-
ment may be the only game in town. While there could be merits in more 
radical reform of  the local state itself, including the entrenchment of  its 
status in constitutional law, it is also fair to say that none of  the previous 
reorganisations has brought about a perfect system. Perhaps this is beside 
the point. Echoing Bauman on the inevitable imperfection of  real life 
communities, no system of  local government is perfect, and any organi-
sational structures should be viewed merely as “interim solutions” bene-
fitting from ongoing scrutiny and iterative improvement (2001, pp. 5–6). 
If  the history of  local government in the Scottish context over the past 
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two centuries reveals anything, it is the need for constant vigilance of, and 
action to maintain and reasonably adjust, the boundary between local 
and central decision-making.
If  the Scottish Parliament in its present devolved form is in many ways 
the product of  Scottish local government’s participation in the Constitu-
tional Convention, perhaps the time has come to reciprocally develop a 
more effective and harmonious relationship between parliament, council 
chambers and communities. Assuming Winnie Ewing—channelling some 
of  Anderson’s “simultaneity” discussed above—was correct that 1999 
saw the “re-convening” of  the Scottish Parliament rather than the cre-
ation of  a new one, it is odd that local government was not represented 
institutionally within it, given the centrality of  the ancient burghs to the 
original body (see MacDonald, 2013, p. 11). Whilst Mill’s preference for 
elitist expertise over local democracy is not easily reconciled with the 
present-day context, there still remains a strong argument for entrenching 
the constitutional status of  local government: as a bulwark against both 
the vicissitudes faced by local inhabitants in a globalising world, and a 
centralising state which, irrespective of  party control, tends to be happier 
devolving responsibility than power.
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